XVThe Patanjali-Darśána

We now set forth the doctrine of that school which professes the opinions of such Munis as Patañjali and others, who originated the system of the Theistic Sáṅkhya philosophy. This school follows the so-called Yoga Śástra promulgated by Patañjali, and consisting of four chapters, which also bears the name of the "Sáṅkhya Pravachana," or detailed explanation of the Sáṅkhya.[363] In the first chapter thereof the venerable Patañjali, having in the opening aphorism, "Now is the exposition of Concentration" (yoga), avowed his commencement of the Yoga Śástra, proceeds in the second aphorism to give a definition of his subject, "Concentration is the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle," and then he expounds at length the nature of Meditation (samádhi). In the second chapter, in the series of aphorisms commencing, "The practical part of Concentration is mortification, muttering, and resignation to the Supreme," he expounds the practical part of yoga proper to him whose mind is not yet thoroughly abstracted (iii. 9), viz., the five external subservients or means, "forbearance," and the rest. In the third chapter, in the series commencing "Attention is the fastening [of the mind] on some spot," he expounds the three internal subservients—attention, contemplation, and meditation, collectively called by the name "subjugation" (saṃyama), and also the various superhuman powers which [232]are their subordinate fruit. In the fourth chapter, in the series commencing, "Perfections spring from birth, plants, spells, mortification, and meditation," he expounds the highest end, Emancipation, together with a detailed account of the five so-called "perfections" (siddhis). This school accepts the old twenty-five principles [of the Sáṅkhya], "Nature," &c.; only adding the Supreme Being as the twenty-sixth—a Soul untouched by affliction, action, fruit, or stock of desert, who of His own will assumed a body in order to create, and originated all secular or Vaidic traditions,[364] and is gracious towards those living beings who are burned in the charcoal of mundane existence.

"But how can such an essence as soul, undefiled as the [glossy] leaf of a lotus, be said to be burned, that we should need to accept any Supreme Being as gracious to it?" To this we reply, that the quality Goodness develops itself as the understanding, and it is this which is, as it were, burned by the quality Activity; and the soul, by the influence of Darkness, blindly identifying itself with this suffering quality, is also said itself to suffer. Thus the teachers have declared—

It has been also said by Patañjali,[366] "The power of the enjoyer, which is itself incapable of development or of transference, in an object which is developed and transferred experiences the modifications thereof."

Now the "power of the enjoyer" is the power of intelligence, and this is the soul; and in an object which is [233]"developed" and "transferred," or reflected,—i.e., in the thinking principle or the understanding,—it experiences the modifications thereof, i.e., the power of intelligence, being reflected in the understanding, receives itself the shadow of the understanding, and imitates the modifications of it. Thus the soul, though in itself pure, sees according to the idea produced by the understanding; and, while thus seeing at second-hand, though really it is different from the understanding, it appears identical therewith. It is while the soul is thus suffering, that, by the practice of the eight subservient means, forbearance, religious observance, &c., earnestly, uninterruptedly, and for a long period, and by continued resignation to the Supreme Being, at length there is produced an unclouded recognition of the distinction between the quality Goodness and the Soul; and the five "afflictions," ignorance, &c., are radically destroyed, and the various "stocks of desert," fortunate or unfortunate, are utterly abolished, and, the undefiled soul abiding emancipated, perfect Emancipation is accomplished.

The words of the first aphorism, "Now is the exposition of concentration," establish the four preliminaries which lead to the intelligent reader's carrying the doctrine into practice, viz., the object-matter, the end proposed, the connection [between the treatise and the object], and the person properly qualified to study it. The word "now" (atha) is accepted as having here an inceptive meaning, [as intimating that a distinct topic is now commenced]. "But," it may be objected, "there are several possible significations of this word atha; why, then, should you show an unwarranted partiality for this particular 'inceptive' meaning? The great Canon for nouns and their gender [the Amara Kosha Dictionary] gives many such meanings. 'Atha is used in the sense of an auspicious particle,—after,—now (inceptive),—what? (interrogatively),—and all (comprehensively).' Now we willingly surrender such senses as interrogation or comprehensiveness;[234] but since there are four senses certainly suitable, i.e., 'after,' 'an auspicious particle,' 'reference to a previous topic,' and 'the inceptive now,' there is no reason for singling out the last." This objection, however, will not stand, for it cannot bear the following alternative. If you maintain the sense of "after," then do you hold that it implies following after anything whatever, or only after some definite cause as comprehended under the general definition of causation,[367] i.e., "previous existence [relatively to the effect]"? It cannot be the former, for, in accordance with the proverb that "No one stands for a single moment inactive," everybody must always do everything after previously doing something else; and since this is at once understood without any direct mention at all, there could be no use in employing the particle atha to convey this meaning. Nor can it be the latter alternative; because, although we fully grant that the practice of concentration does in point of fact follow after previous tranquillity, &c., yet these are rather the necessary preliminaries to the work of exposition, and consequently cannot have that avowed predominance [which the presumed cause should have]. "But why should we not hold that the word atha implies that this very exposition is avowedly the predominant object, and does follow after previous tranquillity of mind, &c.?" We reply, that the aphorism uses the term "exposition" (anuśásana), and this word, etymologically analysed, implies that by which the yoga is explained, accompanied with definitions, divisions, and detailed means and results; and there is no rule that such an exposition must follow previous tranquillity of mind, &c., the rule rather being that, as far as the teacher is concerned, it must follow a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; for it is rather the student's desire to know and his derived knowledge, which should have quiet of mind, &c., as their precursors, in accordance with the words of Śruti: "Therefore [235]having become tranquil, self-subdued, loftily indifferent, patient, full of faith and intent, let him see the soul in the soul."[368] Nor can the word atha imply the necessary precedence, in the teacher, of a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; because, even granting that both these are present, they need not to be mentioned thus prominently, as they are powerless in themselves to produce the necessary intelligence and effort in the student. Still [however we may settle these points] the question arises, Is the exposition of the yoga ascertained to be a cause of final beatitude or not? If it is, then it is still a desirable object, even if certain presupposed conditions should be absent; and if it is not, then it must be undesirable, whatever conditions may be present.[369] But it is clear that the exposition in question is such a cause, since we have such a passage of the Śruti as that [in the Kaṭha Upanishad, ii. 12]: "By the acquirement of yoga or intense concentration on the Supreme Soul, the wise man having meditated leaves behind joy and sorrow;" and again, such a passage of the Smṛiti as that [in the Bhagavad Gítá, ii. 53]: "The intellect unwavering in contemplation will then attain yoga." Hence we conclude that it is untenable to interpret atha as implying that the exposition must follow "after" a previous inquiry on the part of the student, or "after" a previous course of ascetic training and use of elixirs, &c. [to render the body strong].

But in the case of the Vedánta Sútras, which open with the aphorism, "Now, therefore, there is the wish to know Brahman," Śaṅkara Áchárya has declared that the inceptive meaning of atha must be left out of the question, as the wish to know Brahman is not to be undertaken [at will]; and therefore it must be there interpreted to mean "after," i.e., that this desire must follow a previous [236]course of tranquillity, &c., as laid down by the well-known rule which enjoins the practice of tranquillity, self-control, indifference, endurance, contemplation, and faith, the object being to communicate the teaching to a proper student as distinguished by the possession of the four so-called "means."[370]

"Well, then, let us grant that atha cannot mean 'after;' but why should it not be simply an auspicious particle?" But this it cannot be, from the absence of any connection between the context and such auspicious meaning. Auspiciousness implies the obtaining of an unimpeached and desired good, and what is desired is so desired as being the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain; but this auspiciousness cannot belong to the exposition of yoga, since it is in itself neither pleasure nor the cessation of pain.[371] Therefore it cannot be at all established that the meaning of the aphorism is that "the exposition of the yoga is auspicious;" for auspiciousness cannot be either the primary meaning of atha or its secondary meaning by metonymy, since it is its very sound which is in itself auspicious [without any reference to the meaning], like that of a drum. "But why not say that just as an implied meaning may enter into the direct meaning of a sentence, so an effect [like this of auspiciousness] may also be included, since both are equally unexpressed so far as the actual words are concerned?"[372] We reply, that in the meaning of a sentence the connection must be between the meaning of one word and that of another; otherwise we should be guilty of breaking the seal which the rule of the grammarians has set, that "verbal expectancy[373] can be fulfilled by words alone."

[237]

"But ought not a prayer for an auspicious commencement to be put at the beginning of a Śástra, in order to lay the hosts of obstacles that would hinder the completion of the work which the author desires to begin, and also to observe the immemorial practice of the good, since it has been said by the wise, 'Those śástras become widely famous which have auspicious commencements, auspicious middles, and auspicious endings, and their students have long lives and are invincible in disputation'?[374] Now the word atha implies 'auspiciousness,' since there is a Smṛiti which says,

"Therefore let the word atha stand here as signifying 'auspiciousness,' like the word 'vṛiddhi' used by Páṇini in his opening sútra 'vṛiddhir ád aich.'"[375] This view, however, is untenable; since the very word atha, when heard, has an auspicious influence, even though it be employed to convey some other special signification, just as the hearing the sound of lutes, flutes, &c. [is auspicious for one starting on a journey]. If you still object, "How can the particle atha have any other effect, if it is specially used here to produce the idea that the meaning of the sentence is that a new topic is commenced?" we reply that it certainly can have such other additional effect, just as we see that jars of water brought for some other purpose are auspicious omens at the commencement of a journey.[376] Nor does this contradict the smṛiti, [238]since the smṛiti will still hold good, as the words "they are both auspicious" mean only that they produce an auspicious effect.

Nor can the particle atha have here the meaning of "reference to a previous topic," since the previously mentioned faults will all equally apply here, as this meaning really involves that of "after" [which we have already discussed and rejected]. And again, in such discussions as this, as to whether this particular atha means "the inceptive now" or "after," if another topic had been previously suggested, then "reference thereto" would be a possible meaning; but in the present case [where no other topic has been previously suggested] it is not a possible meaning. Therefore, by exhaustion, the commentator finally adopts, for the atha of the sútra, the remaining meaning of "the inceptive now." So, when it is said [in the Táṇḍya Bráhmaṇa, xvi. 8, 1; xvi. 10, 1], "Now this is the Jyotis," "Now this is the Viśvajyotis,"[377] the particle atha is accepted as signifying the commencement of the description of a particular sacrifice, just as the atha in the commencement of the Mahábháshya, "now comes the exposition of words," signifies the commencement of the Institutes of Grammar. This has been declared by Vyása in his Commentary on the Yoga Aphorisms, "the atha in this opening aphorism indicates a commencement;" and Váchaspati has similarly explained it in his gloss; therefore it may be considered as settled that the atha here indicates a commencement and also signifies auspiciousness. Therefore, accepting the view [239]that this atha implies a commencement, let the student be left in peace to strive after a successful understanding of the śástra through the attainment of the yoga, which is its proposed subject, by means of the teacher's explanation of its entire purport. But here some one may say, "Does not the smṛiti of Yájñavalkya say, 'Hiraṇyagarbha is the promulgator of the Yoga, and no other ancient sage?' how then is Patañjali the teacher thereof?" We reply that it was for this reason that the venerable Patañjali,[378] that ocean of compassion, considering how difficult it was to grasp all the different forms of Yoga scattered up and down in the Puráṇas, &c., and wishing to collect together their essence, commenced his anuśásana,—the preposition anu implying that it was a teaching which followed a primary revelation and was not itself the immediate origin of the system.

Since this atha in the aphorism signifies "commencement," the full meaning of the sentence comes out as follows: "be it known that the institute for the exposition of the yoga is now commenced." In this institute the "object-matter," as being that which is produced by it, is yoga [or the "concentration of the mind"], with its means and its fruit; the producing this is its inferior "end;" supreme absorption (kaivalya) is the highest "end" of the yoga when it is produced. The "connection" between the institute and yoga is that of the producer and the thing to be produced; the "connection" between yoga and supreme absorption is that of the means and the end; and this is well known from Śruti and Smṛiti, as I have before shown. And it is established by the general context that those who aim at liberation are the duly qualified persons to hear this institute. Nor need any one be alarmed lest a similar course should be adopted with the opening aphorism of the Vedánta sútras, "Now, therefore, there is a wish to know Brahman;" and [240]lest here, too, we should seek to establish by the general context that all persons who aim at liberation are duly qualified students of the Vedánta. For the word atha, as there used, signifies "succession" [or "after"]; and it is a settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted through a regular channel to duly qualified students, and consequently the question cannot arise as to whether any other meaning is suggested by the context. Hence it has been said, "When Śruti comes [as the determining authority] 'the subject-matter' and the rest have no place."[379] The full meaning of this is as follows: Where a thing is not apprehended from the Veda itself, there the "subject-matter" and the rest can establish the true meaning, not otherwise; but wherever we can attain the meaning by a direct text, there the other modes of interpretation are irrelevant. For when a thing is declared by a text of the Veda which makes its meaning obvious at once, the "subject-matter" and the rest either establish a contrary conclusion or one not contrary. Now, in the former case, the authority which would establish this contrary conclusion is [by the very nature of "śruti"] already precluded from having any force; and in the latter it is useless. This is all declared in Jaimini's aphorism [iii. 3, 14]; "A definite text, a 'sign,' the 'sentence,' the 'subject-matter,' the 'relative position,' or 'the title,'—when any of these come into collision, the later in order is the weaker because its meaning is more remote"[380] [and therefore less obvious]. It has been thus summed up—

[241]

Therefore [after all this long discussion] it may be now considered as settled that, since it has an "object," as well as the other preliminaries, the study of the Śástra, which teaches the Yoga, is to be commenced like that of the Vedánta, which discusses the nature of Brahman. "But," it may be objected, "it is the Yoga which was said to be the object-matter, since it is this which is to be produced, not the Śástra." We grant that the Yoga is the principal object, as that which is to be produced; but since it is produced by the Śástra, especially directed thereto, this Śástra is the means for its production, and, as a general rule, the agent's activity is directly concerned with the means rather than with the end. Just as the operations of Devadatta the woodcutter, i.e., his lifting his arm up and down, &c., relate rather to the instrument, i.e., the axe, than to the object, i.e., the tree, so here the speaker, Patañjali, in his immediate action of speaking, means the Yoga-Śástra as his primary object, while he intends the Yoga itself in his ultimate action of "denotation." In consequence of this distinction, the real meaning is that the commencing the Yogaśástra is that which primarily [242]claims our attention; while the "yoga," or the restraint of the modifications of the mind, is what is to be expounded in this Sáśtra. "But as we read in the lists of roots that the root yuj is used in the sense of 'joining,' should not the word yoga, its derivative, mean 'conjunction,' and not 'restraint'? And indeed this has been said by Yájñavalkya:[381]—

This, however, is untenable, since there is no possibility of any such action,[382] &c., in either as would produce this conjunction of the two souls. [Nor, again, is such an explanation needed in order to remove the opposition of other philosophical schools]; for the notion of the conjunction of two eternal things is opposed to the doctrines of the Vaiśeshika and Nyáya schools [and therefore they would still oppose our theory]. And even if we accepted the explanation in accordance with the Mímáṃsá [or Vedánta], our Yogaśástra would be rendered nugatory by this concession [and the very ground cut from under our feet]; because the identity of the individual and supreme souls being in that school something already accomplished, it could not be regarded as something to be produced by our Śástra. And lastly, as it is notorious that roots are used in many different senses, the root yuj may very well be used here in the sense of "contemplation."[383] Thus it has been said—

Therefore some authors expressly give yuj in this sense, and insert in their lists "yuj in the sense of samádhi." Nor does this contradict Yájñavalkya's declaration, as the word yoga, used by him, may bear this meaning; and he has himself said—

[243]

It has been also said by the venerable Vyása [in his Commentary on the Yoga-sútras, i. 1], "Yoga is samádhi."

An objection however, may be here raised that "the term samádhi is used by Patañjali [in ii. 29] in the sense of one of the eight ancillary parts[384] of the eightfold concentration (or yoga); and the whole cannot be thus itself a part as well as a whole, since the principal and the ancillary must be completely different from each other, as all their attendant circumstances must be different, just as we see in the darśapúrṇamása sacrifices and their ancillary rites the prayájas, and therefore samádhi cannot be the meaning of yoga." We however reply that this objection is incorrect; for although the term samádhi is used for etymological reasons[385] to express the ancillary part which is really defined [in iii. 3] as "the contemplation which assumes the form of the object, and is apparently devoid of any nature of its own;" still the further use of this term to describe the principal state is justified by the author's wish to declare the ultimate oneness of the two states [as the inferior ultimately merges into the superior]. Nor can you hold that etymology alone can decide where a word can be used; because if so, as the word go, "a bull," is derived by all grammarians from the root gam, "to go," we ought never to use the phrase "a standing bull" [as the two words would be contradictory], and the man Devadatta, when going, would properly be called go, "a bull;" and, moreover, the Sútra, i. 2, distinctly gives us a definite justification for employing the word in this sense when it declares that "concentration (yoga) is the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle." [The second or principal sense of samádhi will therefore be quite distinct from the first or inferior.]

[244]

"But surely if yoga is held to be the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle, then as these modifications abide in the soul as themselves partaking of the nature of knowledge, their suppression, or in other words their 'destruction,' would also abide in the soul, since it is a principle in logic that the antecedent non-existence and destruction abide in the same subject as the counter-entity to these negations;[386] and consequently in accordance with the maxim, 'This newly produced character will affect the subject in which it resides,' the absolute independence of the soul itself would be destroyed." This, however, we do not allow; because we maintain that these various modifications which are to be hindered,[387] such as "right notion," "misconception," "fancy," "sleep," and "memory" (i. 6), are attributes of the internal organ (chitta), since the power of pure intelligence, which is unchangeable, cannot become the site of this discriminative perception. Nor can you object that this unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul[388] has not been proved, since there is an argument to establish it; for the intelligent soul must be unchangeable from the fact that it always knows, while that which is not always knowing is not unchangeable, as the internal organ, &c. And so again, if this soul were susceptible of change, then, as this change would be occasional, we could not predicate its always knowing these modifications. But the true view is, that while the intelligent soul always remains as the presiding witness, there is another essentially pure substance[389] which abides always the same; and as it is this which is affected by any given object, so it is this perceptible substance which is reflected as a shadow on the soul, and so produces an [245]impression;[390] and thus Soul itself is preserved in its own proper independence, and it is maintained to be the always knowing, and no suspicion of change alights upon it. That object by which the understanding becomes affected is known; that object by which it is not affected is not known; for the understanding is called "susceptible of change," because it resembles the iron, as it is susceptible of being affected or not by the influence or want of influence of the object which resembles the magnet,—this influence or want of influence producing respectively knowledge or the want of knowledge. "But inasmuch as the understanding and the senses which spring from egoism are all-pervading, are they not always connected with all objects, and thus would it not follow that there should be a knowledge everywhere and always of all things?" We reply that even although we grant that they are all-pervading, it is only where a given understanding has certain modifications in a given body, and certain objects are in a connection with that body, that the knowledge of these objects only, and none other, is produced to that understanding; and therefore, as this limitation is absolute, we hold that objects are just like magnets, and affect the understanding just as these do iron,—coming in contact with it through the channels of the senses. Therefore, the "modifications" belong to the understanding, not to the soul; and so says the Śruti, "Desire, volition, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of firmness,—all this is only the mind." Moreover, the sage Pañchaśikha declared the unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul, "The power that enjoys is unchangeable;" and so Patañjali also (iv. 18), "The modifications of the understanding are always known,—this arises from the unchangeableness of the Ruling Soul." The following is the argument drawn out formally to establish the [246]changeableness of the understanding. The understanding is susceptible of change because its various objects are now known and now not known, just like the organ of hearing and the other organs of sense. Now, this change is notoriously threefold, i.e., a change of "property," of "aspect,"[391] and of "condition." When the subject, the understanding, perceives the colour "blue," &c., there is a change of "property" just as when the substance "gold" becomes a bracelet, a diadem, or an armlet; there is a change of "aspect" when the property becomes present, past, or future; and there is a change of "condition" when there is a manifestation or non-manifestation[392] of the perception, as of blue, &c.; or, in the case of gold, the [relative] newness or oldness [at two different moments] would be its change of condition. These three kinds of change must be traced out by the reader for himself in different other cases. And thus we conclude that there is nothing inconsistent in our thesis that, since "right notion" and the other modifications are attributes of the understanding, their "suppression" will also have its site in the same organ.

[Our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection to what we have said above.] "But if we accept your definition that 'yoga is the suppression of the modifications of the chitta,' this will apply also to 'sound sleep,' since there too we may find the suppression [or suspension] of the modifications found in kshipta, vikshipta, múḍha,[393] &c.; but this would be wrong, because it is impossible for the 'afflictions' to be abolished so long as those states called kshipta, &c., remain at all, and because they only hinder the attainment of the summum bonum. Let us examine this more closely. For the understanding is called kshipta, 'restless,' when it is restless [with [247]an excess of the quality rajas], as being tossed about amidst various objects which engage it. It is called múḍha, 'blinded,' when it is possessed by the modification 'sleep' and is sunk in a sea of darkness [owing to an excess of the quality tamas]. It is called vikshipta, 'unrestless,' when it is different from the first state[394] [as filled with the quality sattva]." We must here, however, note a distinction; for, in accordance with the line of the Bhagavad Gítá (vi. 34), 'The mind, O Kṛishṇa, is fickle, turbulent, violent, and obstinate,' the mind, though naturally restless, may occasionally become fixed by the transient fixedness of its objects; but restlessness is innate to it, or it is produced in it by sickness, &c., or other consequences of former actions; as it is said [in the Yoga Sútras, i. 30], 'Sickness, languor, doubt, carelessness, laziness, addiction to objects, erroneous perception, failure to attain some stage, and instability,—these distractions of the mind are called "obstacles".' Here 'sickness' means fever, &c., caused by the want of equilibrium between the three humours; 'languor' is the mind's want of activity; 'doubt' is a sort of notion which embraces two opposite alternatives; 'carelessness' is a negligence of using the means for producing meditation; 'laziness' is a want of exertion from heaviness of body, speech, or mind; 'addiction to objects' is an attachment to objects of sense; 'erroneous perception' is a mistaken notion of one thing for another; 'failure to attain some stage' is the failing for some reason or other to arrive at the state of abstract meditation; 'instability' is the mind's failure to continue there, even when the state of abstract meditation has been reached. Therefore we maintain that the suppression of the mind's modifications cannot be laid down as the definition of yoga.

We reply, that even although we allow that, so far as regards the three conditions of the mind called kshipta, [248]múḍha, and vikshipta, which [as being connected with the three qualities] are all to be avoided as faulty states, the suppression of the modifications in these conditions is itself something to be avoided [and so cannot be called yoga], this does not apply to the other two conditions called ekágra and niruddha, which are to be pursued and attained; and therefore the suppression of the modifications in these two praiseworthy conditions is rightly to be considered as yoga. Now by ekágra we mean that state when the mind, entirely filled with the sattva quality, is devoted to the one object of meditation; and by niruddha we mean that state when all its developments are stopped, and only their latent impressions [or potentialities] remain.

Now this samádhi, "meditation" [in the highest sense], is twofold: "that in which there is distinct recognition" (saṃprajñáta), and "that in which distinct recognition is lost" (asaṃprajñáta) [Yoga S., i. 17, 18].[395] The former is defined as that meditation where the thought is intent on its own object, and all the "modifications," such as "right notion," &c., so far as they depend on external things, are suppressed, or, according to the etymology of the term, it is where the intellect[396] is thoroughly recognised (samyak prajñáyate) as distinct from Nature. It has a fourfold division, as savitarka, savichára, sánanda, and sásmita. Now this "meditation" is a kind of "pondering" (bhávaná), which is the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all other objects, that which is to be pondered. And that which is thus to be pondered is of two kinds, being either Íśwara or the twenty-five principles. And these principles also are of two kinds—senseless and not senseless. Twenty-four, including nature, intellect, egoism, &c., are senseless; that which is not senseless is Soul. Now among these objects which are to be pondered, when, having taken as the object the gross elements, as earth, [249]&c., pondering is pursued in the form of an investigation as to which is antecedent and which consequent,[397] or in the form of a union of the word, its meaning, and the idea which is to be produced [cf. i. 42]; then the meditation is called "argumentative" (savitarka). When, having taken as its object something subtile, as the five subtile elements and the internal organ, pondering is pursued in relation to space, time, &c., then the meditation is called "deliberative" (savichára). When the mind, commingled with some "passion" and "darkness," is pondered, then the meditation is called "beatific" (sánanda), because "goodness" is then predominant, which consists in the manifestation of joy.[398] When pondering is pursued, having as its object the pure element of "goodness," unaffected by even a little of "passion" or "darkness," then that meditation is called "egoistical" (sásmita), because here personal existence[399] only remains, since the intellectual faculty becomes now predominant, and the quality of "goodness" has become quite subordinate [as a mere stepping-stone to higher things].

But the "meditation, where distinct recognition is lost," consists in the suppression of all "modifications" whatever.

"But" [it may be asked] "was not 'concentration' defined as the suppression of all the modifications? How, then, can the 'meditation where there is distinct recognition' be included in it at all, since we still find active in it that modification of the mind, with the quality of goodness predominant, which views the soul and the quality of goodness as distinct from each other?" This, however, is untenable, because we maintain that concentration is the suppression of the "modifications" of the thinking power, as especially stopping the operation of the "afflictions," the "actions," the "fructifications," and the "stock of deserts."[400]

[250]

The "afflictions" (kleśa) are well known as five, viz., ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence. But here a question is at once raised, In what sense is the word avidyá, "ignorance," used here? Is it to be considered as an avyayíbháva compound, where the former portion is predominant, as in the word "above-board"?[401] or is it a tatpurusha [or karmadháraya] compound, where the latter portion is predominant, as in the word "town-clerk"? or is it a bahuvríhi compound, where both portions are dependent on something external to the compound, as "blue-eyed"? It cannot be the first; for if the former portion of the compound were predominant, then we should have the negation the emphatic part in avidyá (i.e., it would be an instance of what is called the express negation, or prasajya-pratishedha);[402] and consequently, as avidyá would be thus emphatically a negation, it would be unable to produce positive results, as the "afflictions," &c., and the very form of the word should not be feminine, but neuter. It cannot be the second; for any knowledge, whatever thing's absence it may be characterised by (a + vidyá), opposes the "afflictions," &c., and cannot therefore be their source. Nor can it be the third; for then,—in accordance with the words of the author of the Vṛitti,[403] "there is a bahuvríhi compound which is formed with some word meaning 'existence' used after 'not,' with the optional elision of this subsequent word"[404]—we must explain this supposed bahuvríhi compound avidyá as follows: "That buddhi is to be characterised as avidyá (sc. an adjective), [251]of which there is not a vidyá existing." But this explanation is untenable; for such an avidyá could not become the source of the "afflictions;"[405] and yet, on the other hand, it ought to be their source,[406] even though it were associated with the suppression of all the "modifications,"[407] and were also accompanied by that discriminative knowledge of the soul and the quality of goodness [which is found in the sásmita meditation].

Now it is said [in the Yoga Sútras, ii. 4], "Ignorance is the field [or place of origin, i.e., source] of the others, whether they be dormant, extenuated, intercepted, or simple." They are said to be "dormant" when they are not manifested for want of something to wake them up; they are called "extenuated" when, through one's meditating on something that is opposed to them, they are rendered inert; they are called "intercepted" when they are overpowered by some other strong "affliction;" they are called "simple" when they produce their several effects in the direct vicinity of what co-operates with them. This has been expressed by Váchaspati Miśra, in his Gloss on Vyása's Commentary, in the following memorial stanza:—

"No one proposes the fourth solution of the compound avidyá as a dvandva compound,[409] where both portions are equally predominant, because we cannot recognise here two equally independent subjects. Therefore under any [252]one of these three admissible alternatives[410] the common notion of ignorance as being the cause of the 'afflictions' would be overthrown."

[We do not, however, concede this objector's view], because we may have recourse to the other kind of negation called paryudása [where the affirmative part is emphatic], and maintain that avidyá means a contradictory [or wrong] kind of knowledge, the reverse of vidyá; and so it has been accepted by ancient writers. Thus it has been said—

And again—

Váchaspati also says,[411] "The connection of words and their meanings depends on general consent for its certainty; and since we occasionally see that a tatpurusha negation, where the latter portion is properly predominant, may overpower the direct meaning of this latter portion by its contradiction of it, we conclude that even here too [in avidyá] the real meaning is something contrary to vidyá" [i.e., the negative "non-knowledge" becomes ultimately the positive "ignorance"[412]]. It is with a view to this that it is said in the Yoga Aphorisms [ii. 5], "Ignorance is the notion that the non-eternal, the impure, pain, and the non-soul are (severally) eternal, pure, pleasure, and soul." Viparyaya, "misconception," is defined as [253]"the imagining of a thing in what is not that thing,"[413] [i.e., in its opposite]; as, for instance, the imagining the "eternal" in a "non-eternal" thing, i.e., a jar, or the imagining the "pure" in the "impure" body,[414] when it has been declared by a proverbial couplet[415]—

So,—in accordance with the principle enounced in the aphorism (ii. 15), "To the discriminating everything is simply pain, through the pain which arises in the ultimate issue of everything,[416] or through the anxiety to secure it [while it is enjoyed], or through the latent impressions which it leaves behind, and also from the mutual opposition of the influences of the three qualities" [in the form of pleasure, pain, and stupid indifference],—ignorance transfers the idea of "pleasure" to what is really "pain," as, e.g., garlands, sandal-wood, women, &c.; and similarly it conceives the "non-soul," e.g., the body, &c., as the "soul." As it has been said—

Thus this ignorance consists of four kinds.[417]

But [it may be objected] in these four special kinds of ignorance should there not be given some general definition applying to them all, as otherwise their special [254]characteristics cannot be established? For thus it has been said by Bhaṭṭa Kumárila—

This, however, must not be urged here, as it is sufficiently met by the general definition of misconception, already adduced above, as "the imagining of a thing in its opposite."

"Egoism" (asmitá) is the notion that the two separate things, the soul and the quality of purity,[418] are one and the same, as is said (ii. 6), "Egoism is the identifying of the seer with the power of sight." "Desire" (rága) is a longing, in the shape of a thirst, for the means of enjoyment, preceded by the remembrance of enjoyment, on the part of one who has known joy. "Aversion" (dvesha) is the feeling of blame felt towards the means of pain, similarly preceded by the remembrance of pain, on the part of one who has known it. This is expressed in the two aphorisms, "Desire is what dwells on pleasure;" "Aversion is what dwells on pain" (ii. 7, 8).

Here a grammatical question may be raised, "Are we to consider this word anuśayin ('dwelling') as formed by the kṛit affix ṇini in the sense of 'what is habitual,' or the taddhita affix ini in the sense of matup? It cannot be the former, since the affix ṇini cannot be used after a root compounded with a preposition as anuśí; for, as the word supi has already occurred in the Sútra, iii. 2, 4, and has been exerting its influence in the following sútras, this word must have been introduced a second time in the Sútra, iii. 2, 78, supy ajátau ṇinis táchchhílye,[419] on purpose to exclude prepositions, as these have no case terminations; and even if we did strain a point to allow them, still it would follow by the Sútra, vii. 2, 115, acho ñṇiti,[420] that [255]the radical vowel must be subject to vṛiddhi, and so the word must be anuśáyin, in accordance with the analogy of such words as atiśáyin, &c. Nor is the latter view tenable (i.e., that it is the taddhita affix ini[421]), since ini is forbidden by the technical verse—

and the word anuśaya is clearly a kṛit formation as it ends with the affix ach[423] [which brings it under this prohibition, and so renders it insusceptible of the affix ini]. Consequently, the word anuśayin in the Yoga aphorism is one the formation of which it is very hard to justify."[424] This cavil, however, is not to be admitted; since the rule is only to be understood as applying generally, not absolutely, as it does not refer to something of essential importance. Hence the author of the Vṛitti has said—

Therefore, sometimes the prohibited cases are found, as káryin, káryika [where the affixes are added after a kṛit formation], taṇḍulin, taṇḍulika [where they are added after a word meaning "genus"]. Hence the prohibition is only general, not absolute, after kṛit formations and words meaning "genus," and therefore the use of the affix ini is justified, although the word anuśaya is formed by a kṛit affix. This doubt therefore is settled.

[256]

The fifth "affliction," called "tenacity of mundane existence" (abhiniveśa), is what prevails in the case of all living beings, from the worm up to the philosopher, springing up daily, without any immediate cause, in the form of a dread, "May I not be separated from the body, things sensible, &c.," through the force of the impression left by the experience of the pain of the deaths which were suffered in previous lives, this is proved by universal experience, since every individual has the wish, "May I not cease to be," "May I be." This is declared in the aphorism, "Tenacity of mundane existence, flowing on through its own nature, is notorious even in the case of the philosopher" [ii. 9]. These five, "ignorance," &c., are well known as the "afflictions" (kleśa), since they afflict the soul, as bringing upon it various mundane troubles.

[We next describe the karmáśaya of ii. 12, the "stock of works" or "merits" in the mind.] "Works" (karman) consist of enjoined or forbidden actions, as the jyotishṭoma sacrifice, bráhmanicide, &c. "Stock" (áśaya) is the balance of the fruits of previous works, which lie stored up in the mind in the form of "mental deposits" of merit or demerit, until they ripen in the individual soul's own experience as "rank," "years," and "enjoyment" [ii. 13].

Now "concentration" [yoga] consists [by i. 2] in "the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle," which stops the operation of the "afflictions," &c.; and this "suppression" is not considered to be merely the non-existence of the modifications [i.e., a mere negation], because, if it were a mere negation, it could not produce positive impressions on the mind; but it is rather the site of this non-existence,[426]—a particular state of the thinking principle, called by the four names [which will be fully described hereafter], madhumatí, madhupratíká, viśoká, and saṃskáraśeshatá. The word nirodha thus corresponds to its etymological explanation as "that in which the modifications of the thinking principle, right notion, misconception, [257]&c., are suppressed (nirudhyante). This suppression of the modifications is produced by "exercise" and "dispassion" [i. 12]. "Exercise is the repeated effort that the internal organ shall remain in its proper state" [i. 13]. This "remaining in its proper state" is a particular kind of development, whereby the thinking principle remains in its natural state, unaffected by those modifications which at different times assume the form of revealing, energising, and controlling.[427] "Exercise" is an effort directed to this, an endeavour again and again to reduce the internal organ to such a condition. The locative case, sthitau, in the aphorism is intended to express the object or aim, as in the well-known phrase, "He kills the elephant for its skin."[428] "Dispassion is the consciousness of having overcome desire in him who thirsts after neither the objects that are seen nor those that are heard of in revelation" [i. 15]. "Dispassion" is thus the reflection, "These objects are subject to me, not I to them," in one who feels no interest in the things of this world or the next, from perceiving the imperfections attached to them.

Now, in order to reduce the "afflictions" which hinder meditation and to attain meditation, the yogin must first direct his attention to practical concentration, and "exercise" and "dispassion" are of especial use in its attainment. This has been said by Kṛishṇa in the Bhagavad Gítá [vi. 3]—

Patañjali has thus defined the practical yoga: "Practical concentration is mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation to the Lord" [ii. 1]. Yájñavalkya has described "mortification"—

[258]

"Recitation of texts" is the repetition of the syllable Om, the gáyatrí, &c. Now these mantras are of two kinds, Vaidik and Tántrik. The Vaidik are also of two kinds, those chanted and those not chanted. Those chanted are the sámans; those not chanted are either in metre, i.e., the ṛichas, or in prose, i.e., the yajúṃshi, as has been said by Jaimini,[430] "Of these, that is a ṛich in which by the force of the sense there is a definite division into pádas [or portions of a verse]; the name sáman is applied to chanted portions; the word yajus is applied to the rest." Those mantras are called Tántrik which are set forth in sacred books that are directed to topics of voluntary devotion;[431] and these are again threefold, as female, male, and neuter; as it has been said—

They are called "all-powerful" (siddha) because they counteract all defects in their performance, and produce their effect even when the ordinary consecrating ceremonies, as bathing, &c., have been omitted.

Now the peculiar "consecrating ceremonies" (saṃskára) are ten, and they have been thus described in the Śáradá-tilaka—

But enough of this venturing to make public the tantra mysteries connected with mantras, which has suddenly led us astray like an unexpected Bacchanalian dance.[436]

The third form of practical yoga, "resignation to the Lord" (íśvara-praṇidhána), is the consigning all one's works, whether mentioned or not, without regard to fruit, to the Supreme Lord, the Supremely Venerable. As it has been said—

This self-resignation is also sometimes defined as "the surrender of the fruits of one's actions," and is thus a peculiar kind of faith, since most men act only with a selfish regard to the fruit. Thus it is sung in the Bhagavad Gítá [ii. 47]—

The harmfulness of aiming at the fruit of an action has been declared by the venerable Nílakaṇṭha-bháratí—

[261]

Now this prescribed practice of mortification, recitation, and resignation is itself called yoga, because it is a means for producing yoga, this being an instance of the function of words called "superimponent pure Indication," as in the well-known example, "Butter is longevity." "Indication" is the establishing of another meaning of a word from the incompatibility of its principal meaning with the rest of the sentence, and from the connection of this new meaning with the former; it is twofold, as founded on notoriety or on a motive. This has been declared in the Kávya-prakáśa [ii. 9]—

Now the word "this" [i.e., tat in the neuter, which the neuter yat in the extract would have naturally led us to expect instead of the feminine sá] would have signified some neuter word, like "implying," which is involved as a subordinate part of the verb "is indicated." But sá is used in the feminine [by attraction to agree with lakshaṇá], "this is indication," i.e., the neuter "this" is put in the feminine through its dependence on the predicate. This has been explained by Kaiyaṭa, "Of those pronouns which imply the identity of the subject and the predicate, the former takes the gender of the former, the latter of the latter."[437] Now "expert (kuśala) in business" is an example of Indication from notoriety; for the word kuśala, which is [262]significant in its parts by being analysed etymologically as kuśaṃ + láti, "one who gathers kuśa grass for the sacrifice," is here employed to mean "expert" through the relation of a similarity in character, as both are persons of discernment; and this does not need a motive any more than Denotation does, since each is the using a word in its recognised conventional sense in accordance with the immemorial tradition of the elders. Hence it has been said—

Therefore indication based on notoriety has no regard to any motive. Although a word, when it is employed, first establishes its principal meaning, and then by that meaning a second meaning is subsequently indicated, and so indication belongs properly to the principal meaning and not to the word; still, since it is superadded to the word which originally established the primary meaning, it is called [improperly by metonymy] a function of the word. It was with a view to this that the author of the Kávya-prakáśa used the expression, "This is 'Indication,' the superadded function of the word." But the indication based on a motive is of six kinds: 1. inclusive indication,[438] as "the lances enter" [where we really mean "men with the lances"]; 2. indicative indication, as "the benches shout" [where the spectators are meant without the benches]; 3. qualified[439] superimponent indication, as "the man of the Panjáb is an ox" [here the object is not swallowed up in the simile]; 4. qualified introsusceptive indication, as "that ox" [here the man is swallowed up in the simile]; 5. pure superimponent indication, as "ghí is life;" 6. pure [263]introsusceptive indication, as "verily this is life." This has been all explained in the Kávya-prakáśa [ii. 10-12]. But enough of this churning of the depths of rhetorical discussions.

This yoga has been declared to have eight things ancillary to it (aṅga); these are the forbearances, religious observances, postures, suppression of the breath, restraint, attention, contemplation, and meditation [ii. 29]. Patañjali says, "Forbearance consists in not wishing to kill, veracity, not stealing, continence, not coveting" [ii. 30]. "Religious observances are purifications, contentment, mortification, recitation of texts, and resignation to the Lord" [ii. 32]; and these are described in the Vishṇu Puráṇa [vi. 7, 36-38]—

"A 'posture' is what is steady and pleasant" [ii. 46]; it is of ten kinds, as the padma, bhadra, víra, svastika, daṇḍaka, sopáśraya, paryaṅka, krauñchanishadana, ushṭranishadana, samasaṃsthána. Yájñavalkya has described each of them in the passage which commences—

[264]

The descriptions of the others must be sought in that work.—When this steadiness of posture has been attained, "regulation of the breath" is practised, and this consists in "a cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" [ii. 49]. Inspiration is the drawing in of the external air; expiration is the expelling of the air within the body; and "regulation of the breath" is the cessation of activity in both movements. "But [it may be objected] this cannot be accepted as a general definition of 'regulation of breath,' since it fails to apply to the special kinds, as rechaka, púraka, and kumbhaka." We reply that there is here no fault in the definition, since the "cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" is found in all these special kinds. Thus rechaka, which is the expulsion of the air within the body, is only that regulation of the breath, which has been mentioned before as "expiration;" and púraka, which is the [regulated] retention of the external air within the body, is the "inspiration;" and kumbhaka is the internal suspension of breathing, when the vital air, called práṇa, remains motionless like water in a jar (kumbha). Thus the "cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration" applies to all, and consequently the objector's doubt is needless.

Now this air, beginning from sunrise, remains two ghaṭikás and a half[440] in each artery[441] (náḍi), like the revolving buckets on a waterwheel.[442] Thus in the course of a day and night there are produced 21,600 inspirations [265]and expirations. Hence it has been said by those who know the secret of transmitting the mantras, concerning the transmission of the ajapámantra[443]—

So at the time of the passing of the air through the arteries, the elements, earth, &c., must be understood, according to their different colours, by those who wish to obtain the highest good. This has been thus explained by the wise—

When the element air is thus comprehended and its restraint is accomplished, the evil influence of works which concealed discriminating knowledge is destroyed [ii. 52]; hence it has been said—

And again—

Now in this way, having his mind purified by the "forbearances" and the other things subservient to concentration, the devotee is to attain "self-mastery" (saṃyama)[452] and "restraint" (pratyáhára). "Restraint" is the accommodation of the senses, as the eye, &c., to the nature of the mind,[453] which is intent on the soul's unaltered nature, while they abandon all concernment with their own several objects, which might excite desire or anger or stupid indifference. This is expressed by the etymology of the word; the senses are drawn to it (á + hṛi), away from them (pratípa).

"But is it not the mind which is then intent upon the soul and not the senses, since these are only adapted for external objects, and therefore have no power for this supposed action? How, therefore, could they be accommodated [268]to the nature of the mind?" What you say is quite true; and therefore the author of the aphorisms, having an eye to their want of power for this, introduced the words "as it were," to express "resemblance." "Restraint is, as it were, the accommodation of the senses to the nature of the mind in the absence of concernment with each one's own object" [ii. 54]. Their absence of concernment with their several objects for the sake of being accommodated to the nature of the mind is this "resemblance" which we mean. Since, when the mind is restrained, the eye, &c., are restrained, no fresh effort is to be expected from them, and they follow the mind as bees follow their king. This has been declared in the Vishṇu-puráṇa [vi. 7, 43, 44]—

"Attention" (dháraṇá) is the fixing the mind, by withdrawing it from all other objects, on some place, whether connected with the internal self, as the circle of the navel, the lotus of the heart, the top of the sushumṇá artery, &c., or something external, as Prajápati, Vásava, Hiraṇyagarbha, &c. This is declared by the aphorism, "'Attention' is the fixing the mind on a place" [iii. 1]; and so, too, say the followers of the Puráṇas—

[269]

The continual flow of thought in this place, resting on the object to be contemplated, and avoiding all incongruous thoughts, is "contemplation" (dhyána); thus it is said, "A course of uniform thought there, is 'contemplation'" [iii. 2]. Others also have said—

We incidentally, in elucidating something else, discussed the remaining eighth ancillary thing, "meditation" (samádhi, see p. 243). By this practice of the ancillary means of yoga, pursued for a long time with uninterrupted earnestness, the "afflictions" which hinder meditation are abolished, and through "exercise" and "dispassion" the devotee attains to the perfections designated by the names Madhumatí and the rest.

"But why do you needlessly frighten us with unknown and monstrous words from the dialects of Karṇáṭa, Gauḍa,[456] and Láṭa?"[457] We do not want to frighten you, but rather to gratify you by explaining the meaning of these strange words; therefore let the reader who is so needlessly alarmed listen to us with attention.

i. The Madhumatí perfection,—this is the perfection of meditation, called "the knowledge which holds to the truth," consisting in the illumination of unsullied purity by means of the contemplation of "goodness," composed of the manifestation of joy, with every trace of "passion" or "darkness" abolished by "exercise," "dispassion," &c. Thus it is said in the aphorisms, "In that case there is the knowledge which holds to the truth" [i. 48]. It holds "to the truth," i.e., to the real; it is never overshadowed by error. "In that case," i.e., when firmly established, there arises this knowledge to the second yogin. For the yogins [270]or devotees to the practice of yoga are well known to be of four kinds, viz.,—

i. The práthamakalpika, in whom the light has just entered,[458] but, as it has been said, "he has not won the light which consists in the power of knowing another's thoughts, &c.;" 2. The madhubhúmika, who possesses the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3. The prajñájyotis, who has subdued the elements and the senses; 4. The atikránta-bhávaníya, who has attained the highest dispassion.

ii. The Madhupratíká perfections are swiftness like thought, &c. These are declared to be "swiftness like thought, the being without organs, and the conquest of nature" [iii. 49]. "Swiftness like thought" is the attainment by the body of exceeding swiftness of motion, like thought; "the being without bodily organs"[459] is the attainment by the senses, irrespective of the body, of powers directed to objects in any desired place or time; "the conquest of nature" is the power of controlling all the manifestations of nature. These perfections appear to the full in the third kind of yogin, from the subjugation by him of the five senses and their essential conditions.[460] These perfections are severally sweet, each one by itself, as even a particle of honey is sweet, and therefore the second state is called Madhupratíká [i.e., that whose parts are sweet].

iii. The Viśoká perfection consists in the supremacy over all existences, &c. This is said in the aphorisms, "To him who possesses, to the exclusion of all other ideas, the discriminative knowledge of the quality of goodness and the soul, arises omniscience and the supremacy over all existences" [iii. 50]. The "supremacy over all existences" is the overcoming like a master all entities, as these are but the developments of the quality of "goodness" in the mind [the other qualities of "passion" and [271]"darkness" being already abolished], and exist only in the form of energy and the objects to be energised upon.[461] The discriminative knowledge of them, as existing in the modes "subsided," "emerged," or "not to be named,"[462] is "omniscience." This is said in the aphorisms [i. 36], "Or a luminous immediate cognition, free from sorrow[463] [may produce steadiness of mind]."

iv. The Saṃskáraśeshatá state is also called asaṃprajñáta, i.e., "that meditation in which distinct recognition of an object is lost;" it is that meditation "without a seed" [i.e., without any object] which is able to stop the "afflictions" that produce fruits to be afterwards experienced in the shape of rank, length of life, and enjoyment; and this meditation belongs to him who, in the cessation of all modifications of the internal organ, has reached the highest "dispassion." "The other kind of meditation [i.e., that in which distinct recognition of an object is lost] is preceded by that exercise of thought which produces the entire cessation of modifications; it has nothing left but the latent impressions" [of thought after the departure of all objects] [i.e., saṃskáraśesha, i. 18]. Thus this foremost of men, being utterly passionless towards everything, finds that the seeds of the "afflictions," like burned rice-grains, are bereft of the power to germinate, and they are abolished together with the internal organ. When these are destroyed, there ensues, through the full maturity of his unclouded "discriminative knowledge," an absorption of all causes and effects into the primal prakṛiti; and the soul, which is the power of pure intelligence, abiding in its own real nature, and escaped from all connection with the phenomenal understanding (buddhi), or with existence, reaches "absolute isolation" (kaivalya). Final liberation is described by Patañjali as two perfections: "Absolute isolation is the repressive absorption[464] of the 'qualities' which have consummated [272]the ends of the soul, i.e., enjoyment and liberation, or the abiding of the power of intelligence in its own nature" [iv. 33]. Nor should any one object, "Why, however, should not the individual be born again even though this should have been attained?" for that is settled by the well-known principle that "with the cessation of the cause the effect ceases," and therefore this objection is utterly irrelevant, as admitting neither inquiry nor decision; for otherwise, if the effect could arise even in the absence of the cause, we should have blind men finding jewels, and such like absurdities; and the popular proverb for the impossible would become a possibility. And so, too, says the Śruti, "A blind man found a jewel; one without fingers seized it; one without a neck put it on; and a dumb man praised it."[465]

Thus we see that, like the authoritative treatises on medicine, the Yoga-śástra consists of four divisions; as those on medicine treat of disease, its cause, health, and medicine, so the Yoga-śástra also treats of phenomenal existence, its cause, liberation, and its cause. This existence of ours, full of pain, is what is to be escaped from; the connection of nature and the soul is the cause of our having to experience this existence; the absolute abolition of this connection is the escape; and right insight is the cause thereof.[466] The same fourfold division is to be similarly traced as the case may be in other Śástras also. Thus all has been made clear.

[273]

The system of Śaṅkara, which comes next in succession, and which is the crest-gem of all systems, has been explained by us elsewhere; it is therefore left untouched here.[467]

E. B. C.

NOTE ON THE YOGA.

There is an interesting description of the Yogins on the Mountain Raivataka in Mágha (iv. 55):—

"There the votaries of meditation, well skilled in benevolence (maitrí) and those other purifiers of the mind,—having successfully abolished the 'afflictions' and obtained the 'meditation possessed of a seed,' and having reached that knowledge which recognises the essential difference between the quality Goodness and the Soul,—desire yet further to repress even this ultimate meditation."

It is curious to notice that maitrí, which plays such a prominent part in Buddhism, is counted in the Yoga as only a preliminary condition from which the votary is to take, as it were, his first start towards his final goal. It is called a parikarman (= prasádhaka) in Vyása's Comm. i. 33 (cf. iii. 22), whence the term is borrowed by Mágha. Bhoja expressly says that this purifying process is an external one, and not an intimate portion of yoga itself; just as in arithmetic the operations of addition, &c., are valuable, not in themselves, but as aids in effecting the more important calculations which arise subsequently. The Yoga seems directly to allude to Buddhism in this marked depreciation of its cardinal virtue.

NOTE ON P. 237, LAST LINE.

For the word vyákopa in the original here (see also p. 242, l. 3 infra), cf. Kusumáñjali, p. 6, l. 7.

[275]

APPENDIX.

ON THE UPÁDHI (cf. supra, pp. 7, 8, 174, 194).

[As the upádhi or "condition" is a peculiarity of Hindu logic which is little known in Europe, I have added the following translation of the sections in the Bháshá-parichchheda and the Siddhánta-muktávalí, which treat of it.]

Our author now proceeds to define the upádhi or condition,[468] which is used to stop our acquiescence in a universal proposition as laid down by another person;—"that which always accompanies," &c. The meaning of this is that the so-called condition, while it invariably [276]accompanies that which is accepted as the major term, does not thus invariably accompany that which our opponent puts forward as his middle term. [Thus in the false argument, "The mountain has smoke because it has fire," we may advance "wet fuel," or rather "the being produced from wet fuel," as an upádhi, since "wet fuel" is necessarily found wherever smoke is, but not always where fire is, as e.g., in a red-hot iron ball.]

"But," the opponent may suggest, "if this were true, would it not follow that (a) in the case of the too wide middle term in the argument, 'This [second] son of Mitrá's, whom I have not seen, must be dark because he is Mitrá's son,' we could not allege 'the being produced from feeding on vegetables'[469] as a 'condition,'—inasmuch as it does not invariably accompany a dark colour, since a dark colour does also reside in things like [unbaked] jars, &c., which have nothing to do with feeding on vegetables? (b) Again, in the argument, 'The air must be perceptible to sense[470] because it is the site of touch,' we could not allege the 'possessing proportionate form' as a 'condition;' because perceptibility [to the internal sense] is found in the soul, &c., and yet soul, &c., have no form [and therefore the 'possessing proportionate form' does not invariably accompany perceptibility]. (c) Again, in the argument,'Destruction is itself perishable, because it is produced,' we could not allege as a 'condition' the 'being included in some positive category of existence'[471] [destruction being a form of non-existence, called "emergent," dvaṃśábháva], [277]inasmuch as perishability is found in antecedent non-existence, and this certainly cannot be said to be included in any positive category of existence."

We, however, deny this, and maintain that the true meaning of the definition is simply this,—that whatever fact or mark we take to determine definitely, in reference to the topic, the major term which our condition is invariably to accompany, that same fact or mark must be equally taken to determine the middle term which our said condition is not invariably to accompany. Thus (a) the "being produced from feeding on vegetables" invariably accompanies "a dark colour," as determined by the fact that it is Mitrá's son, whose dark colour is discussed [and this very fact is the alleged middle term of the argument; but the pretended contradictory instance of the dark jar is not in point, as this was not the topic discussed]. (b) Again, "possessing proportionate form" invariably accompanies perceptibility as determined by the fact that the thing perceived is an external object; while it does not invariably accompany the alleged middle term "the being the site of touch," which is equally to be determined by the fact that the thing perceived is to be an external object.[472] (c) Again, in the argument "destruction is perishable from its being produced," the "being included in some positive category of existence" invariably accompanies the major term "perishable," when determined by the attribute of being produced. [And this is the middle term advanced; and therefore the alleged contradictory instance, "antecedent non-existence," is not in point, since nobody pretends that this is produced at all.]

But it is to be observed that there is nothing of this kind in valid middle terms, i.e., there is nothing there [278]which invariably accompanies the major term when determined by a certain fact or mark, and does not so accompany the middle term when similarly determined. This is peculiar to the so-called condition. [Should the reader object that "in each of our previous examples there has been given a separate determining mark or attribute which was to be found in each of the cases included under each; how then, in the absence of some general rule, are we to find out what this determining mark is to be in any particular given case?" We reply that] in the case of any middle term which is too general, the required general rule consists in the constant presence of one or other of the following alternatives, viz., that the subjects thus to be included are either (i.) the acknowledged site of the major term, and also the site of the condition,[473] or else (ii.) the acknowledged site of the too general middle term, but excluding the said condition;[474] and it will be when the case is determined by the presence of one or other of these alternatives that the condition will be considered as "always accompanying the major term, and not always accompanying the middle term."[475]

[279]

The meaning of this is that it is in consequence of the middle term being found too general in regard to the condition, that we infer that it is too general in regard to the major term; and hence the use of having a condition at all. (a.) Thus, where the condition invariably accompanies an unlimited[478] major term, we infer that the middle term is too general in regard to the major term, from the very fact that it is too general in regard to the condition; as, for example, in the instance "the mountain has smoke because it has fire," where we infer that the "fire" is too general in regard to "smoke," since it is too general in regard to "wet fuel;" for there is a rule that what is too general for that which invariably accompanies must also be too general for that which is invariably accompanied. (b.) But where we take some fact or mark to determine definitely the major term which the condition is invariably to accompany,—there it is from the middle term's being found too general in regard to the condition in cases possessing this fact, or mark that we infer that the middle term is equally too general in regard to the major term. Thus in the argument, "B is dark because he is Mitrá's son," the middle term "the fact of being Mitrá's [280]son" is too general in regard to the sádhya, "dark colour," because it is too general in regard to the upádhi, "feeding on vegetables," as seen in the case of Mitrá's second son [Mitrá's parentage being the assumed fact or mark, and Mitrá herself not having fed on vegetables previous to his birth].

[But an objector might here interpose, "If your definition of a condition be correct, surely a pretended condition which fulfils your definition can always be found even in the case of a valid middle term. For instance, in the stock argument 'the mountain must have fire because it has smoke,' we may assume as our pretended condition 'the being always found elsewhere than in the mountain;' since this certainly does not always 'accompany the middle term,' inasmuch as it is not found in the mountain itself where the smoke is acknowledged to be; and yet it apparently does 'always accompany the major term,' since in every other known case of fire we certainly find it, and as for the present case you must remember that the presence of fire in this mountain is the very point in dispute." To this we reply] You never may take such a condition as "the being always found elsewhere than in the subject or minor term" (unless this can be proved by some direct sense-evidence which precludes all dispute); because, in the first place, you cannot produce any argument to convince your antagonist that this condition does invariably accompany the major term [since he naturally maintains that the present case is exactly one in point against you]; and, secondly, because it is self-contradictory [as the same nugatory condition may be equally employed to overthrow the contrary argument].

But if you can establish it by direct sense-evidence, then the "being always found elsewhere than in the subject"[281] becomes a true condition, [and serves to render nugatory the false argument which a disputant tries to establish]. Thus in the illusory argument "the fire must be non-hot because it is artificial," we can have a valid condition in "the being always found elsewhere than in fire," since we can prove by sense-evidence that fire is hot,[479] [thus the upádhi here is a means of overthrowing the false argument].

Where the fact of its always accompanying the major term, &c., is disputed, there we have what is called a disputed condition.[480] But "the being found elsewhere than in the subject" can never be employed even as a disputed condition, in accordance with the traditional rules of logical controversy.[481]

E. B. C.

THE END.

TRÜBNER'S ORIENTAL SERIES.

"A knowledge of the commonplace, at least, of Oriental literature, philosophy, and religion is as necessary to the general reader of the present day as an acquaintance with the Latin and Greek classics was a generation or so ago. Immense strides have been made within the present century in these branches of learning; Sanskrit has been brought within the range of accurate philology, and its invaluable ancient literature thoroughly investigated; the language and sacred books of the Zoroastrians have been laid bare; Egyptian, Assyrian, and other records of the remote past have been deciphered, and a group of scholars speak of still more recondite Accadian and Hittite monuments; but the results of all the scholarship that has been devoted to these subjects have been almost inaccessible to the public because they were contained for the most part in learned or expensive works, or scattered throughout the numbers of scientific periodicals. Messrs. Trübner & Co., in a spirit of enterprise which does them infinite credit, have determined to supply the constantly-increasing want, and to give in a popular, or, at least, a comprehensive form, all this mass of knowledge to the world."—Times.

Second Edition, post 8vo, pp. xxxii.-748, with Map, cloth, price 21s.

THE INDIAN EMPIRE:
ITS PEOPLE, HISTORY, AND PRODUCTS.

By the Hon. Sir W. W. Hunter, K.C.S.I., C.S.I., C.I.E., LL.D.,

Member of the Viceroy's Legislative Council,

Director-General of Statistics to the Government of India.

Being a Revised Edition, brought up to date, and incorporating the general results of the Census of 1881.

THE FOLLOWING WORKS HAVE ALREADY APPEARED:—

Third Edition, post 8vo, cloth, pp. xvi.-428, price 16s.

ESSAYS ON THE SACRED LANGUAGE, WRITINGS,
AND RELIGION OF THE PARSIS.

By Martin Haug, Ph.D.,

Late of the Universities of Tübingen, Göttingen, and Bonn; Superintendent of Sanskrit Studies, and Professor of Sanskrit in the Poona College.

Edited and Enlarged by Dr. E. W. West.

To which is added a Biographical Memoir of the late Dr. Haug by Prof. E. P. Evans.

I. History of the Researches into the Sacred Writings and Religion of the Parsis, from the Earliest Times down to the Present.

II. Languages of the Parsi Scriptures.

III. The Zend-Avesta, or the Scripture of the Parsis.

IV. The Zoroastrian Religion, as to its Origin and Development.

Post 8vo, cloth, pp. viii.-176, price 7s. 6d.

TEXTS FROM THE BUDDHIST CANON

COMMONLY KNOWN AS "DHAMMAPADA."

With Accompanying Narratives.

Translated from the Chinese by S. BEAL, B.A., Professor of Chinese, University College, London.

The Dhammapada, as hitherto known by the Pali Text Edition, as edited by Fausböll, by Max Müller's English, and Albrecht Weber's German translations, consists only of twenty-six chapters or sections, whilst the Chinese version, or rather recension, as now translated by Mr. Beal, consists of thirty-nine sections. The students of Pali who possess Fausböll's text, or either of the above-named translations, will therefore needs want Mr. Beal's English rendering of the Chinese version; the thirteen above-named additional sections not being accessible to them in any other form; for, even if they understand Chinese, the Chinese original would be unobtainable by them.

Second Edition, post 8vo, cloth, pp. xxiv.-360, price 10s. 6d.

THE HISTORY OF INDIAN LITERATURE.

By Albrecht Weber.

Translated from the Second German Edition by John Mann, M.A., and Théodor Zachariae, Ph.D., with the sanction of the Author.

Post 8vo, cloth, pp. xii.-198, accompanied by Two Language Maps, price 7s. 6d.

A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF THE EAST INDIES.

By Robert N. Cust.

The Author has attempted to fill up a vacuum, the inconvenience of which pressed itself on his notice. Much had been written about the languages of the East Indies, but the extent of our present knowledge had not even been brought to a focus. It occurred to him that it might be of use to others to publish in an arranged form the notes which he had collected for his own edification.

Second Corrected Edition, post 8vo, pp. xii.-116, cloth, price 5s.

THE BIRTH OF THE WAR-GOD.

A Poem. By Kalidasa.

Translated from the Sanskrit into English Verse by
Ralph T. H. Griffith, M.A.

Post 8vo, pp. 432, cloth, price 16s.

A CLASSICAL DICTIONARY OF HINDU MYTHOLOGY
AND RELIGION, GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY, AND
LITERATURE.

By John Dowson, M.R.A.S.,
Late Professor of Hindustani, Staff College.

Post 8vo, with View of Mecca, pp. cxii.-172, cloth, price 9s.

SELECTIONS FROM THE KORAN.

By Edward William Lane,

Translator of "The Thousand and One Nights;" &c., &c.

A New Edition, Revised and Enlarged, with an Introduction by
Stanley Lane Poole.

Post 8vo, pp. vi.-368, cloth, price 14s.

MODERN INDIA AND THE INDIANS,

BEING A SERIES OF IMPRESSIONS, NOTES, AND ESSAYS.

By Monier Williams, D.C.L.,

Hon. LL.D. of the University of Calcutta, Hon. Member of the Bombay Asiatic Society,
Boden Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Oxford.

Third Edition, revised and augmented by considerable Additions,
with Illustrations and a Map.

Post 8vo, pp. xliv.-376, cloth, price 14s.

METRICAL TRANSLATIONS FROM SANSKRIT WRITERS.

With an Introduction, many Prose Versions, and Parallel Passages from
Classical Authors.

By J. Muir, C.I.E., D.C.L., LL.D., Ph.D.

Second Edition, post 8vo, pp. xxvi.-244, cloth, price 10s. 6d.

THE GULISTAN;

Or, Rose Garden of Shekh Mushliu'd-din Sadi of Shiraz.

Translated for the First Time into Prose and Verse, with an
Introductory Preface, and a Life of the Author, from the Atish Kadah,

By Edward B. Eastwick, C.B., M.A., F.R.S., M.R.A.S.

In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. viii.-408 and viii.-348, cloth, price 28s.

MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS RELATING TO INDIAN SUBJECTS.

By Brian Houghton Hodgson, Esq., F.R.S.,

Late of the Bengal Civil Service; Corresponding Member of the Institute;
Chevalier of the Legion of Honour; late British Minister at the Court of Nepal, &c., &c.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

Section I.—On the Kocch, Bódó, and Dhimál Tribes.—Part I. Vocabulary.—Part II. Grammar.—Part III. Their Origin, Location, Numbers, Creed, Customs, Character, and Condition, with a General Description of the Climate they dwell in—Appendix.

Section II.—On Himalayan Ethnology.—I. Comparative Vocabulary of the Languages of the Broken Tribes of Népál.—II. Vocabulary of the Dialects of the Kiranti Language.—III. Grammatical Analysis of the Váyu Language. The Váyu Grammar.—IV. Analysis of the Báhing Dialect of the Kiranti language. The Báhing Grammar.—V. On the Váyu or Háyu Tribe of the Central Himaláya.—VI. On the Kiranti Tribe of the Central Himaláya.

CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

Section III.—On the Aborigines of North-Eastern India. Comparative Vocabulary of the Tibetan, Bódó, and Gáró Tongues.

Section IV.—Aborigines of the North-Eastern Frontier.

Section V.—Aborigines of the Eastern Frontier.

Section VI.—The Indo-Chinese Borderers, and their connection with the Himalayans and Tibetans. Comparative Vocabulary of Indo-Chinese Borderers in Arakan. Comparative Vocabulary of Indo-Chinese Borderers in Tenasserim.

Section VII.—The Mongolian Affinities of the Caucasians.—Comparison and Analysis of Caucasian and Mongolian Words.

Section VIII.—Physical Type of Tibetans.

Section IX.—The Aborigines of Central India.—Comparative Vocabulary of the Aboriginal Languages of Central India.—Aborigines of the Eastern Ghats.—Vocabulary of some of the Dialects of the Hill and Wandering Tribes in the Northern Sircars.—Aborigines of the Nilgiris, with Remarks on their Affinities.—Supplement to the Nilgirian Vocabularies.—The Aborigines of Southern India and Ceylon.

Section X.—Route of Nepalese Mission to Pekin, with Remarks on the Water-Shed and Plateau of Tibet.

Section XI.—Route from Káthmándú, the Capital of Nepâl, to Darjeeling in Sikim.—Memorandum relative to the Seven Cosis of Nepâl.

Section XII.—Some Accounts of the Systems of Law and Police as recognised in the State of Nepâl.

Section XIII.—The Native Method of making the Paper denominated Hindustan, Népálese.

Section XIV.—Pre-eminence of the Vernaculars; or, the Anglicists Answered; Being Letters on the Education of the People of India.

"For the study of the less-known races of India Mr. Brian Hodgson's 'Miscellaneous Essays' will be found very valuable both to the philologist and the ethnologist."

Third Edition, Two Vols., post 8vo, pp. viii.-268 and viii.-326, cloth, price 21s.

THE LIFE OR LEGEND OF GAUDAMA,

THE BUDDHA OF THE BURMESE. With Annotations.

The Ways to Neibban, and Notice on the Phongyies or Burmese Monks.

By the Right Rev. P. Bigandet,

Bishop of Ramatha, Vicar-Apostolic of Ava and Pegu.

Post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-420, cloth, price 18s.

CHINESE BUDDHISM.

A VOLUME OF SKETCHES, HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL.

By J. Edkins, D.D.

Author of "China's Place in Philology," "Religion in China," &c., &c.

Post 8vo, pp. 496, cloth, price 10s. 6d.

LINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS.

Written from the Year 1846 to 1878.

By Robert Needham Cust,

Late Member of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service;
Hon. Secretary to the Royal Asiatic Society; and
Author of "The Modern Languages of the East Indies."

Post 8vo, pp. civ.-348, cloth, price 18s.

BUDDHIST BIRTH STORIES; or, Jataka Tales.

The Oldest Collection of Folk-lore Extant:

BEING THE JATAKATTHAVANNANA,

For the first time Edited in the original Pāli.

By V. Fausboll;

And Translated by T. W. Rhys Davids.

Translation. Volume I.

Post 8vo, pp. xxviii.-362, cloth, price 14s.

A TALMUDIC MISCELLANY;

Or, A THOUSAND AND ONE EXTRACTS FROM THE TALMUD, THE MIDRASHIM, AND THE KABBALAH.

Compiled and Translated by PAUL ISAAC HERSHON, Author of "Genesis According to the Talmud," &c.

With Notes and Copious Indexes.

Post 8vo, pp. xii.-228, cloth, price 7s. 6d.

THE CLASSICAL POETRY OF THE JAPANESE.

By Basil Hall Chamberlain, Author of "Yeigo Heñkaku Shirañ."

Post 8vo, pp. xii.-164, cloth, price 10s. 6d.

THE HISTORY OF ESARHADDON (Son of Sennacherib),

KING OF ASSYRIA, b.c. 681-668.

Translated from the Cuneiform Inscriptions upon Cylinders and Tablets in the British Museum Collection; together with a Grammatical Analysis of each Word, Explanations of the Ideographs by Extracts from the Bi-Lingual Syllabaries, and List of Eponyms, &c.

By Ernest A. Budge, B.A., M.R.A.S., Assyrian Exhibitioner, Christ's College, Cambridge.

Post 8vo, pp. 448, cloth, price 21s.

THE MESNEVI

(Usually known as The Mesneviyi Sherif, or Holy Mesnevi) OF MEVLANA (OUR LORD) JELALU 'D-DIN MUHAMMED ER-RUMI.

Book the First.

Together with some Account of the Life and Acts of the Author, of his Ancestors, and of his Descendants.

Illustrated by a Selection of Characteristic Anecdotes, as Collected by their Historian,

Mevlana Shemsu-'D-Din Ahmed, el Eflaki, el 'Arifi.

Translated, and the Poetry Versified, in English,

By James W. Redhouse, M.R.A.S., &c.

Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-280, cloth, price 6s.

EASTERN PROVERBS AND EMBLEMS

Illustrating Old Truths.

By Rev. J. Long,

Member of the Bengal Asiatic Society, F.R.G.S.

Post 8vo, pp. viii.-270, cloth, price 7s. 6d.

INDIAN POETRY;

Containing a New Edition of the "Indian Song of Songs," from the Sanscrit of the "Gita Govinda" of Jayadeva; Two Books from "The Iliad of India" (Mahabharata), "Proverbial Wisdom" from the Shlokas of the Hitopadesa, and other Oriental Poems.

By Edwin Arnold, C.S.I., Author of "The Light of Asia."

'Beautiful Radha, jasmine-bosomed Radha,'

Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-296, cloth, price 10s. 6d.

THE MIND OF MENCIUS;

Or, POLITICAL ECONOMY FOUNDED UPON MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

A Systematic Digest of the Doctrines of the Chinese Philosopher Mencius.

Translated from the Original Text and Classified, with Comments and Explanations,

By the Rev. Ernst Faber, Rhenish Mission Society.

Translated from the German, with Additional Notes,

By the Rev. A. B. Hutchinson, C.M.S., Church Mission, Hong Kong.

Post 8vo, pp. 336, cloth, price 16s.

THE RELIGIONS OF INDIA.

By A. Barth.

Translated from the French with the authority and assistance of the Author.

The author has, at the request of the publishers, considerably enlarged the work for the translator, and has added the literature of the subject to date; the translation may, therefore, be looked upon as an equivalent of a new and improved edition of the original.

Post 8vo, pp. viii.-152, cloth, price 6s.

HINDU PHILOSOPHY.

The SĀnkhya KĀrika Of Is'wara Krishna.

An Exposition of the System of Kapila, with an Appendix on the Nyāya and Vais'eshika Systems.

By John Davies, M.A. (Cantab.), M.R.A.S.

The system of Kapila contains nearly all that India has produced in the department of pure philosophy.

Second Edition. Post 8vo, pp. x.-130, cloth, price 6s.

A MANUAL OF HINDU PANTHEISM. VEDÂNTASÂRA.

Translated, with copious Annotations,

By Major G. A. Jacob,

Bombay Staff Corps; Inspector of Army Schools.

The design of this little work is to provide for missionaries, and for others who, like them, have little leisure for original research, an accurate summary of the doctrines of the Vedânta.

Post 8vo, pp. xii.-154, cloth, price 7s. 6d.

TSUNI—||GOAM:

The Supreme Being of the Khoi-Khoi.

By THEOPHILUS HAHN, Ph.D.,

Custodian of the Grey Collection, Cape Town; Corresponding Member of the Geogr. Society, Dresden; Corresponding Member of the Anthropological Society, Vienna, &c., &c.

In Four Volumes. Post 8vo, Vol. I., pp. xii.-392, cloth, price 12s. 6d., Vol. II., pp. vi.-408, cloth, price 12s. 6d.,
Vol. III., pp. viii.-414, cloth, price 12s. 6d., Vol. IV., pp. viii.-340, cloth, price 10s. 6d.

A COMPREHENSIVE COMMENTARY TO THE QURAN.

To which is prefixed Sale's Preliminary Discourse, with Additional Notes and Emendations.

Together with a Complete Index to the Text, Preliminary Discourse, and Notes.

By Rev. E. M. WHERRY, M.A., Lodiana.

Second Edition. Post 8vo, pp. vi.-208, cloth, price 8s. 6d.

THE BHAGAVAD-GÎTÂ.

Translated, with Introduction and Notes.

By John Davies, M.A. (Cantab.)

Post 8vo, pp. 96, cloth, price 5s.

THE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM.

Translated by E. H. WHINFIELD, M.A., Barrister-at-Law, late H.M. Bengal Civil Service.

Post 8vo, pp. xxxii.-336, cloth, price 10s. 6d.

THE QUATRAINS OF OMAR KHAYYAM.

The Persian Text, with an English Verse Translation.

By E. H. WHINFIELD, late of the Bengal Civil Service.

Post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-268, cloth, price 9s.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE UPANISHADS AND ANCIENT INDIAN METAPHYSICS.

As exhibited in a series of Articles contributed to the Calcutta Review.

By ARCHIBALD EDWARD GOUGH, M.A., Lincoln College, Oxford; Principal of the Calcutta Madrasa.

In Two Volumes. Vol. I., post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-230, cloth, price 7s. 6d.

A COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF THE EGYPTIAN AND MESOPOTAMIAN RELIGIONS.

By Dr. C. P. Tiele.

Vol. I.—History of the Egyptian Religion.

Translated from the Dutch with the Assistance of the Author.

By JAMES BALLINGAL.

Post 8vo, pp. xii.-302, cloth, price 8s. 6d.

YUSUF AND ZULAIKHA.

A Poem by Jami.

Translated from the Persian into English Verse.

By Ralph T. H. Griffith.

Post 8vo, pp. viii.-266, cloth, price 9s.

LINGUISTIC ESSAYS.

By Carl Abel.

Post 8vo, pp. ix.-281, cloth, price 10s. 6d.

THE SARVA-DARSANA-SAMGRAHA;

Or, Review Of The Different Systems of Hindu Philosophy.

By Madhava Acharya.

Translated by E. B. COWELL, M. A., Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Cambridge, and A. E. GOUGH, M.A., Professor of Philosophy in the Presidency College, Calcutta.

This work is an interesting specimen of Hindu critical ability. The author successively passes in review the sixteen philosophical systems current in the fourteenth century in the South of India; and he gives what appears to him to be their most important tenets.

Post 8vo, pp. lxv.-368, cloth, price 14s.

TIBETAN TALES DERIVED FROM INDIAN SOURCES.

Translated from the Tibetan of the Kah-Gyur.

By F. Anton Von Schiefner.

Done into English from the German, with an Introduction,

By W. R. S. Ralston, M.A.

Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-224, cloth, price 9s.

UDÂNAVARGA.

A Collection of Verses from the Buddhist Canon.

Compiled by DHARMATRÂTA.

Being the Northern Buddhist Version of Dhammapada.

Translated from the Tibetan of Bkah-hgyur, with Notes, and Extracts from the Commentary of Pradjnavarman,

By W. Woodville Rockhill.

In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xxiv.-566, cloth, accompanied by a Language Map, price 18s.

A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF AFRICA.

By Robert Needham Cust,

Barrister-at-Law, and late of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service.

Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. xv.-250, cloth, price 7s. 6d.

OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF RELIGION TO THE SPREAD OF THE UNIVERSAL RELIGIONS.

By C. P. Tiele,

Doctor of Theology, Professor of the History of Religions in the University of Leyden.

Translated from the Dutch by J. Estlin Carpenter, M.A.

Post 8vo, pp. xii.-312, with Maps and Plan, cloth, price 14s.

A HISTORY OF BURMA.

Including Burma Proper, Pegu, Taungu, Tenasserim, and Arakan. From the Earliest Time to the End of the First War with British India.

By Lieut.-Gen. Sir Arthur P. Phayre, G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., and C.B., Membre Correspondant de la Société Académique Indo-Chinoise de France.

Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. 276, cloth, price 7s. 6d.

RELIGION IN CHINA.

By Joseph Edkins, D.D., Peking.

Post 8vo, pp. x.-274, cloth, price 9s.

THE LIFE OF THE BUDDHA AND THE EARLY HISTORY OF HIS ORDER.

Derived from Tibetan Works in the Bkah-hgyur and Bstan-hgyur. Followed by notices on the Early History of Tibet and Khoten.

Translated by W. W. ROCKHILL, Second Secretary U.S. Legation in China.

Third Edition. Post 8vo, pp. viii.-464, cloth, price 16s.

THE SANKHYA APHORISMS OF KAPILA.

With Illustrative Extracts from the Commentaries.

Translated by J. R. BALLANTYNE, LL.D., late Principal of the Benares College.

Edited by FITZEDWARD HALL.

In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. cviii.-242, and viii.-370, cloth, price 24s. Dedicated by permission to H.R.H. the Prince of Wales.

BUDDHIST RECORDS OF THE WESTERN WORLD,

Translated from the Chinese of Hiuen Tsiang (a.d. 629).

By Samuel Beal, B.A.,

(Trin. Coll., Camb.); R.N. (Retired Chaplain and N.I.); Professor of Chinese, University College, London; Rector of Wark, Northumberland, &c.

An eminent Indian authority writes respecting this work:—"Nothing more can be done in elucidating the History of India until Mr. Beal's translation of the 'Si-yu-ki' appears."

Post 8vo, pp. xlviii.-398, cloth, price 12s.

THE ORDINANCES OF MANU.

Translated from the Sanskrit, with an Introduction.

By the late A.C. BURNELL, Ph.D., C.I.E.

Completed and Edited by E.W. HOPKINS, Ph.D., of Columbia College, N.Y.

Post 8vo, pp. xii.-234, cloth, price 9s.

THE LIFE AND WORKS OF ALEXANDER CSOMA DE KOROS,

Between 1819 and 1842. With a Short Notice of all his Published and Unpublished Works and Essays. From Original and for most part Unpublished Documents.

By THEODORE DUKA, M.D., F.R.C.S. (Eng.), Surgeon-Major H.M.'s Bengal Medical Service, Retired, &c.

In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xii.-318 and vi.-312, cloth, price 21s.

MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA.

Reprinted from "Dalrymple's Oriental Repertory," "Asiatic Researches," and the "Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal."

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

I.—Some Accounts of Quedah. By Michael Topping.

II.—Report made to the Chief and Council of Balambangan, by Lieut. James Barton, of his several Surveys.

III.—Substance of a Letter to the Court of Directors from Mr. John Jesse, dated July 20, 1775, at Borneo Proper.

IV.—Formation of the Establishment of Poolo Peenang.

V.—The Gold of Limong. By John Macdonald.

VI.—On Three Natural Productions of Sumatra. By John Macdonald.

VII.—On the Traces of the Hindu Language and Literature extant amongst the Malays. By William Marsden.

VIII.—Some Account of the Elastic Gum Vine of Prince-Wales Island. By James Howison.

IX.—A Botanical Description of Urceola Elastica, or Caoutchouc Vine of Sumatra and Pulo-Pinang. By William Roxburgh, M.D.

X.—An Account of the Inhabitants of the Poggy, or Nassau Islands, lying off Sumatra. By John Crisp.

XI.—Remarks on the Species of Pepper which are found on Prince-Wales Island. By William Hunter, M.D.

XII.—On the Languages and Literature of the Indo-Chinese Nations. By J. Leyden, M.D.

XIII.—Some Account of an Orang-Outang of remarkable height found on the Island of Sumatra. By Clarke Abel, M.D.

XIV.—Observations on the Geological Appearances and General Features of Portions of the Malayan Peninsula. By Captain James Low.

XV.—Short Sketch of the Geology of Pulo-Pinang and the Neighbouring Islands. By T. Ware.

XVI.—Climate of Singapore.

XVII.—Inscription on the Jetty at Singapore.

XVIII.—Extract of a Letter from Colonel J. Low.

XIX.—Inscription at Singapore.

XX—An Account of Several Inscriptions found in Province Wellesley. By Lieut.-Col. James Low.

XXI.—Note on the Inscriptions from Singapore and Province Wellesley. By J. W. Laidlay.

XXII.—On an Inscription from Keddah. By Lieut.-Col. Low.

XXIII.—A Notice of the Alphabets of the Philippine Islands.

XXIV.—Succinct Review of the Observations of the Tides in the Indian Archipelago.

XXV.—Report on the Tin of the Province of Mergui. By Capt. G. B Tremenheere.

XXVI.—Report on the Manganese of Mergui Province. By Capt. G. B. Tremenheere.

XXVII.—Paragraphs to be added to Capt. G. B. Tremenheere's Report.

XXVIII.—Second Report on the Tin of Mergui. By Capt. G. B. Tremenheere.

XXIX.—Analysis of Iron Ores from Tavoy and Mergui, and of Limestone from Mergui. By Dr. A. Ure.

XXX.—Report of a Visit to the Pakchan River, and of some Tin Localities in the Southern Portion of the Tenasserim Provinces. By Capt. G. B. Tremenheere.

XXXI.—Report on a Route from the Mouth of the Pakchan to Krau, and thence across the Isthmus of Krau to the Gulf of Siam. By Capt. Al. Fraser and Capt. J. G. Forlong.

XXXII.—Report, &c., from Capt. G. B. Tremenheere on the Price of Mergui Tin Ore.

XXXIII.—Remarks on the Different Species of Orang-utan. By E. Blyth.

XXXIV.—Further Remarks. By E. Blyth.

CONTENTS OF VOL. II.

XXXV.—Catalogue of Mammalia inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula and Islands. By Theodore Cantor, M.D.

XXXVI.—On the Local and Relative Geology of Singapore. By J. R. Logan.

XXXVII.—Catalogue of Reptiles inhabiting the Malayan Peninsula and Islands. By Theodore Cantor, M.D.

XXXVIII.—Some Account of the Botanical Collection brought from the Eastward, in 1841, by Dr. Cantor. By the late W. Griffith.

XXXIX.—On the Flat-Horned Taurine Cattle of S.E. Asia. By E. Blyth.

XL.—Note, by Major-General G. B. Tremenheere.

General Index.

Index of Vernacular Terms.

Index of Zoological Genera and Sub-Genera occurring in Vol. II.

"The papers treat of almost every aspect of Indo-China—its philology, economy, geography, geology—and constitute a very material and important contribution to our accessible information regarding that country and its people."—Contemporary Review.

Post 8vo, pp. xii.-72, cloth, price 5s.

THE SATAKAS OF BHARTRIHARI.

Translated from the Sanskrit

By the Rev. B. Hale Wortham, M.R.A.S.,

Rector of Eggesford, North Devon.

Post 8vo, pp. xii.-180, cloth, price 6s.

ANCIENT PROVERBS AND MAXIMS FROM BURMESE SOURCES;

Or, THE NITI LITERATURE OF BURMA.

By James Gray,

Author of "Elements of Pali Grammar," "Translation of the Dhammapada," &c.

The Sanscrit-Pâli word Nîti is equivalent to "conduct" in its abstract, and "guide" in its concrete signification. As applied to books, it is a general term for a treatise which includes maxims, pithy sayings, and didactic stories, intended as a guide to such matters of everyday life as form the character of an individual and influence him in his relations to his fellow-men. Treatises of this kind have been popular in all ages, and have served as a most effective medium of instruction.

Post 8vo, pp. xxxii. and 330, cloth, price 7s. 6d.

MASNAVI I MA' NAVI:

THE SPIRITUAL COUPLETS OF MAULANA JALALU-'D-DIN MUHAMMAD I RUMI.

Translated and Abridged by E. H. WHINFIELD, M.A., Late of H.M. Bengal Civil Service.

Post 8vo, pp. viii. and 346, cloth, price 10s. 6d.

MANAVA-DHARMA-CASTRA: THE CODE OF MANU.

Original Sanskrit Text, with Critical Notes. By J. Jolly, Ph.D.,

Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Wurzburg; late Tagore Professor of Law in the University of Calcutta.

The date assigned by Sir William Jones to this Code—the well-known Great Law Book of the Hindus—is 1250-500 b.c., although the rules and precepts contained in it had probably existed as tradition for countless ages before. There has been no reliable edition of the Text for Students for many years past, and it is believed, therefore, that Prof. Jolly's work will supply a want long felt.

Post 8vo, pp. 215, cloth, price 7s. 6d.

LEAVES FROM MY CHINESE SCRAP-BOOK.

By Frederic Henry Balfour.

Author of "Waifs and Strays from the Far East," "Taoist Texts," "Idiomatic Phrases in the Peking Colloquial," &c. &c.

Post 8vo, pp. xvi.-548, with Six Maps, cloth, price 21s.

LINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS.

Written from the Year 1847 to 1887. Second Series.

By Robert Needham Cust, LL.D.,

Barrister-at-Law; Honorary Secretary of the Royal Asiatic Society; Late Member of Her Majesty's Indian Civil Service.

In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. x.-308 and vi.-314, cloth, price 25s.

MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS RELATING TO INDO-CHINA.

Edited By R. Rost, Ph.D., &c. &c., Librarian to the India Office.

Second Series.

Reprinted for the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society from the Malayan "Miscellanies," the "Transactions and Journal" of the Batavian Society, and the "Journals" of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, and the Royal Geographical and Royal Asiatic Societies.

Post 8vo, pp. xii.-512, price 16s.

FOLK-TALES OF KASHMIR.

By the Rev. J. Hinton Knowles, F.R.G.S., M.R.A.S., &c.

(C.M.S.) Missionary to the Kashmiris.

In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. xii.-336 and X.-352, cloth, price 21s.

MEDIÆVAL RESEARCHES FROM EASTERN ASIATIC SOURCES.

Fragments Towards the Knowledge of the Geography and History of Central and Western Asia from the Thirteenth to the Seventeenth Century.

By E. Bretschneider, M.D.,

Formerly Physician of the Russian Legation at Pekin.

In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. l.-408 and 431, cloth, price 36s.

ALBERUNI'S INDIA:

AN ACCOUNT OF ITS RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, LITERATURE, GEOGRAPHY, CHRONOLOGY,
ASTRONOMY, CUSTOMS, LAW, AND ASTROLOGY (About a.d. 1031).

Translated into English.

With Notes and Indices by Prof. EDWARD SACHAU, University of Berlin.

∵ The Arabic Original, with an Index of the Sanskrit Words, Edited by Professor SACHAU, is in the press.

Post 8vo, pp. xxxvii.-218, cloth, price 10s.

THE LIFE OF HIUEN TSIANG.

By the Shamans Hwui Li and Yen-tsung.

With a Preface containing an account of the Works of I-Tsing.

By Samuel Beal, B.A.

(Trin. Coll., Camb.); Professor of Chinese, University College, London; Rector of Wark, Northumberland, &c.

Author of "Buddhist Records of the Western World," "The Romantic Legend of Sakya Buddha," &c.

When the Pilgrim Hiuen Tsiang returned from his travels in India, he took up his abode in the Temple of "Great Benevolence;" this convent had been constructed by the Emperor in honour of the Empress, Wen-te-hau. After Hiuen Tsiang's death, his disciple, Hwui Li, composed a work which gave an account of his illustrious Master's travels; this work when he completed he buried, and refused to discover its place of concealment. But previous to his death he revealed its whereabouts to Yen-tsung, by whom it was finally revised and published. This is "The Life of Hiuen Tsiang." It is a valuable sequel to the Si-yu-ki, correcting and illustrating it in many particulars.

IN PREPARATION:—

Post 8vo.

A SKETCH OF THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF OCEANIA.

By R. N. Cust, LL. D.

Author of "Modern Languages of the East," "Modern Languages of Africa," &c.

London: Trübner & CO.,   57 and 59 Ludgate Hill.